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ABSTRACT: The relative hegemony of land rentiers and real estate developers over the process of urban 
socio-economic reproduction is a defining characteristic of the “collusive regime” of Rome. Through the 
analysis of a case study, we tried to establish if the realisation of Urban Development Projects in this 
regime favours the unequal distribution of the benefits deriving from urban development. Applying a neo-
Gramscian lens to urban political economy, we identified an interpretative model for explaining the role of 
UDPs in the urban regime of Rome. First, UDPs are suitable occasions for realising accumulation strategies 
based on the capture of rent gaps and the valorisation of urban assets. Second, the actors involved in 
UDPs mobilise ideational and material resources for gathering consensus for a project, that rewards their 
specific interests, by framing their investment as the best solution for localised collective needs. UDPs in 
Rome, therefore, facilitate the concentration of benefits and the generalisation of costs of urban 
development.  
Our research contributes to the understanding of Rome’s fragile trajectory of growth and offers insights 
on the mechanisms reinforcing unequal urban development.  
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Rome is the largest municipality in Italy and one of the largest in Europe, but its status as a modern 
metropolis is contentious. Researchers have described Rome as being subjected to an uncertain and weak 
metropolisation (d’Albergo, Moini and Pizzo 2018) and as a city in transition from the ephemeral success of 
the mid-1990s to a deep fiscal and political crisis from the mid-2000s onwards (Causi 2018; Coppola and 
Punziano 2018; Tocci 2015).  
Scholars have highlighted the nexus between the physical expansion of Rome and its historical 
development model. The spatial pattern of growth that the city has followed since the 1950s is a monocentric 
structure replicating itself outwards and increasingly further away from the city centre. The economic 
mechanism supporting this outward growth was based on the capture of the value increase of the abundant 
agricultural land surrounding the ancient and modern city that was converted into sprawling building sites 
(Pizzo 2020). 
A social outcome of this development model is the spatialisation of inequality, which is a linear function 
of the distance from the historical city centre. The city's outskirts are, on average, characterised by the 
highest socio-economic fragility and marginalisation and by poor or insufficient public services.  
As a corrective to this unsustainable development model, the last masterplan of 2003-2008 introduced the 
idea of polycentrism, which would be realised through so-called “urban-metropolitan sub-centres” 
(Marcelloni 2003). They were presented as a way of contrasting the marginalisation of the suburbs, which 
was connected not only to their physical distance from the city centre but also to the lack of functional 
specialisation of those areas. The antidote should have been public and private investments in advanced 
services, specialised productive hubs, knowledge centres, mega-event facilities, and so on.  
This policy discourse and ad hoc planning regulations framed the urban development of Rome for 20 
years. Two decades since the approval of the masterplan and the subsequent realisation of many of those 
“sub-centres”, the city is still characterised by strong and increasing inequalities between the centre and the 
peripheries (Lelo, Monni and Tommasi 2019). 
Large-scale urban development projects (UDPs) were a strategic component of the planned polycentric 
metropolisation. Several UDPs were devised in the periphery or near-periphery to act as catalyst for further 
investments, and a smaller subset was realised.  
These projects were devised under different general economic conditions and local political majorities, 
and they widely differ in scope and content. However, all these UDPs had a weak socio-economic impact for 
the city, whose trajectory of development is still ridden with fragilities and seemingly unable to lead to an 
actual shared economic growth. 
These considerations beg the question of why there is a gap between high expectations and unsatisfactory 
collective outcomes of UDPs. Which political, social and economic characteristics of the urban development 
model of Rome can help interpret the weak impacts of UDPs on the city and its citizens? Have UDPs 









The article is organised as follows: the next section presents the theoretical framework guiding our study, 
applying a neo-Gramscian lens to read the urban regime of Rome, and briefly discuss the methodology we 
followed. The third section details the case study we selected for empirical research, the new Italian 
headquarters of the BNP Paribas bank holding company located in eastern Rome. In the fourth section, we 
propose an interpretive model based on our case study, which helps to answer our research questions. The 
final section briefly discusses the results of our study. 
One last introductory remark: the research has been conducted from late 2019 to mid-2020. For this 
reason, the article is not addressing the challenges posed to urban environment by COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework and methodology 
 
2.1 Urban political economy: a neo-Gramscian reading 
 
In Rome, the interrelations between various actors – chiefly landowners, developers, investors, and local 
institutions, as well as public and private enterprises, national politicians and government officials – form a 
relatively stable field of interaction that can be described as an ideal-typical “collusive” urban regime 
(d’Albergo and Moini 2015). The term “collusive” is not employed in its juridical meaning. It instead defines 
a political-economic model presiding over the development of the city.  
The relative hegemony of land rentiers and real estate developers over the process of urban socio-
economic reproduction is a defining characteristic of this regime (Pizzo and Di Salvo 2015). This statement 
requires two qualifications. First, focusing on the hegemony of developers and land and property owners 
does not equate to considering them to be the most influential power players of the local elite, who alone 
determine the economic decision-making and policymaking in the city. The concept of hegemony (discussed 
below in further details) emphasises the relational and strategic nature of social power, as well as its 
consensual and coercive dimensions. Furthermore, it is incompatible with the simplified depiction of social 
actors as homogeneous, individual-like rational agents. Speaking of hegemony implies the recognition of 
diversified social class positionings, that are determined by the unequal structuration of socio-material 
reproduction. Actors are capable of agency upon societal arrangements insomuch as they generate shared 
cultural-political imaginaries and organise for collective action.  
Second, the role of rent and rent-maximising actions in urban development must be addressed1. For 
investments in land and property, the principle of “highest and best use” of capital translates into seeking the 
highest rent gap (Smith 1996), either by the increase in value obtained from land tenure transactions or by 
new development or renewal projects. Capturing the highest rent gap implies satisfying at least one of the 
following conditions (Pizzo forthcoming): 1. the project starts on a low-productivity plot that was not 
previously eligible for development (e.g. capturing the value increase produced by turning agricultural land 
into a construction site); 2. brownfield sites are purchased to capitalise on favourable existing conditions 
(such as existing infrastructures). An investor often waits for someone else’s investment to realise condition 
1 or 2, or both, and then jumps on the bandwagon by acquiring or redeveloping a surrounding plot. 
 
1 Several contributions have aptly captured the importance of the debate on ground rent for the evolution of the research 
agenda of urban political economy (see inter alia Haila 1990; Ward and Aalbers 2016). The complexity of this category led to 








“Someone else” is often the local or national government, or a public or semi-public institutional investor. 
The possibility or impossibility of claiming higher rent by exploiting rent gaps shapes investment and selling 
decisions, maintenance or disrepair of existing buildings, the degree of building density in an area, and so on 
(Clark 1995). “Islands of opportunity” and discontinuities in the urban fabric are thus formed, which co-
determine the spatialisation of urban inequalities and orient the strategies of rent-seeking actors in a path 
dependent manner.  
Land rentiers and real estate developers share interests and goals shaped by the common position they 
occupy in the urban socio-material structure. However, they compete among themselves for realising the 
most profitable investment opportunities, they confront other local or extra-local economic actors that are 
equally interested in directing the course of urban development, and they face the limitations and the costs 
imposed by public policy and local politics. A degree of collective coordination is essential for overcoming 
barriers, acquiring resources and having an influence on the use of urban space.   
The collusive regime of Rome is a response to this need. It can be described as a set of political-
hegemonic relationships between local and extra-local actors, that establishes a contingent coherency 
between their interests and goals and, at the same time, allows them to pursue specific strategies for taking 
maximum advantage from the general process of wealth production (d’Albergo and Moini 2013). It steers 
the development model followed by the city, but it fosters an opportunistic commitment of material and 
ideational resources by key economic actors. Moreover, the generalised benefits deriving from the 
development model – routinely invoked for building consensus around it – are tenuous and unequally 
distributed over the socio-spatial fabric. Further conceptualisation of urban power blocs is important for 
understanding the evolution of Rome’s collusive regime, the weak metropolisation of the city (Moini and 
Pizzo 2017), and the growing socio-economic inequalities found in the urban area (Esposto and Moini 2020).  
The neo-Gramscian approach to urban political economy (Jessop 1997) explicitly takes into account the 
articulation of economic strategies and political projects in the urban space. The urban context is here 
understood as the site of various accumulation strategies, or courses of action devised by actors for 
advancing their interests in the context of the historical and localised pattern of productive and distributive 
relationships in which they are embedded (McGuirk 2004). The conflicts and cooperation among these actors 
– within the structural limits imposed by the modes of production and allocation of material resources – 
determine the predominant configuration of capital accumulation in an urban space for a relatively long time 
(regime of accumulation). Political relations, institutional systems and ideational constellations coevolve 
with the accumulation regime and contribute to its reproduction (mode of regulation).    
The combination of an accumulation regime and a mode of regulation delimits a provisional development 
model for an urban space, which tends to differ city by city. This is the meaning of the concept of urban 
regime adopted in our study.   
The relationships among actors have a crucial importance for explaining the stability or transformation of 
an urban regime. The dominant and subordinate capitalist class fractions and the subalterns2 constitute the 
point of departure for studying how territorial alliances and conflicts are organised and how they, in turn, re-
organise the space of accumulation. Analysing these relations in term of class fractions helps to overcome 
 
2 In themselves variegated, being subjected to different modes and levels of exploitation and being characterised by 
different cultural, ethnic, gender, national, etc. identities. For Gramsci, as S. Hall remarked in an important contribution 
to Gramscian studies, «is understood that classes, while sharing certain common conditions of existence, are also cross-
cut by conflicting interests, historically segmented and fragmented in this actual course of historical formation. Thus the 
“unity” of classes is necessarily complex and has to be produced – constructed, created – as a result of specific 








the double pitfall of local voluntarism (i.e. individual actors and their contingent decisions are the causal 
forces that shape an urban regime) and territorial determinism (i.e. economic structures and their path 
dependent development are the only explanatory variables). Nonetheless, the concept of class fraction is 
slippery. It risks reproducing, at a higher level of abstraction, the variety of actors found operating in every 
empirical case.  
S. Clarke (1978) offered a definition of class fraction grounded in the Marxian analysis of social 
(productive) relations under capitalism. Different capitalist agents enter into the process of economic 
production and reproduction owning a «“particular form” of capital», which corresponds to «specialized 
“functions” in the circuit of capital which […] give rise to specialized capitals: productive capital, bank 
capital, commercial capital, [and] landed capital» (Ibid., 57). Following this insight, we can use the analytical 
label “class fraction” to describe a function of the total movement of capital (landed capital, commercial 
capital, industrial capital, interest-bearing capital) and to identify the distributional mechanism through 
which revenues are received by the capital owners (rent, commercial profit, industrial profit, interest). 
These functions are represented by agents (i.e. individual capitalists) in production, exchange and 
distribution. Fractional positioning is not a fixed and immutable identity attributed once and for all; it 
changes with the development of the capitalist mode of production. Marx already noted that the 
concentration of money-capital in the banking sector was eroding the importance of specialised commercial 
money-dealing capitalists (Fine 1986). D. Harvey has argued that landed property is losing its historical 
peculiarities and is becoming increasingly indistinguishable from the ownership of financial assets (Haila 
1988). 
Moreover, as convincingly argued by J. R. Bryson (1997), the individual agents may represent one or 
more of these fractions in each concrete case. A good example are the owners of capital who play a major 
role in the built environment, such as landowners, real estate developers, construction companies, and 
financial investors: a developer-cum-builder represents the commercial and industrial fractions, a bank 
investing in real estate assets represents the interest-bearing and the landed ones. 
Class fractions should be understood as an analytical tool for studying how the interests and goals of 
concrete actors are shaped by the prevalent function they fulfil in a spatio-temporally situated accumulation 
process. An actor will try to devise an accumulation strategy that satisfies its fractional interests – its 
“economic-corporative” interest in Gramscian terms – and sustains the expansion of accumulation.  
Political unity among the various social forces involved in, or affected by, an accumulation strategy is a 
necessary condition to minimise opposition and foster coordination, and it is not reached automatically. 
Establishing a provisional consensus for an accumulation strategy among the fractions of the capitalist class 
and (part of) the subalterns is the rationale of hegemonic projects. They entail the mobilisation of ideational 
and material resources for gathering «support behind a concrete program of action that asserts a contingent 
general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the 
hegemonic class (fraction) […] while derogating the pursuit of other interests that are inconsistent with the 
project» (Jessop 1997, 62). 
B. Jessop insists on the importance of the act of separating a local socio-economic space from the 
indistinct flow of capitals across places and scales, by evoking various economic and political imaginaries 
(Jessop 2010) for consolidating a community of interest that may support the accumulation strategy and 
provide it with its extra-economic conditions.  
A fraction of capital becomes hegemonic when it succeeds in forming a bloc connecting its interests and 








bloc» (Jessop 1997, 51) is characterised by the “concrete coordination” of class interests. The dominant 
fraction has to offer, to the subordinate fractions and to (part of) the subalterns, the possibility of identifying 
their own material interest and desired outcomes with the projected course of action. In other words, the 
hegemonic bloc needs a principle of generalisation of interests and goals, together with a principle of 
inclusion-exclusion, to discern who has needs and desires that are consistent with the overarching goals of 
the hegemonic projects.  
Starting from the 1980s, accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects at both national and local levels 
have undergone a reconfiguration, as a result of processes of scalar reorganisation of production and de-
structuring of the nation-wide institutions and social compacts associated with the Fordist-Keynesian 
regulation of socio-economic reproduction. This paradigmatic change, which established the basis for the 
neoliberal phase of capitalism, has been associated with a transformation in the form of hegemony. In 
Fordist-Keynesian development model, the centrality of the wage relation, in both production and 
consumption and for both capital and labour, induced the dominant fraction of capital – the industrial – to 
pursue an «expansive hegemony in which the support of the entire population is mobilised through material 
concessions and symbolic rewards» (Jessop 1991, 175). In that context, capitalist urban development and 
housing were receptive to the need to lower the cost of labour power by the means of public provision, and 
they were equally subject to the political and social claims of organised labour (Harvey 1976).  
The form of hegemony that emerged with neoliberalism has been described as “two-nations” hegemony. It 
«require[s] containment and even repression of the other nation at the same time as [it] involve[s] selective 
access and concessions for the more favoured nation» (Jessop 1991, 175). Neoliberal hegemonic projects 
became less concerned with gaining the support of the entire population but were instead more selective and 
directed toward specific social groups and spatial contexts (Smith 2011). Urban development and housing 
provision also underwent similar transformations, mobilising the support of selected groups of urban 
dwellers for site-specific interventions while passing the costs of an increasingly unequal urban development 
to others.  
The construction by public and private actors of homeownership and property-based wealth as a 
justification of wealth polarisation, and of the built environment as an ideal and material site of redistribution 
of income from labour to capital, was crucial in the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony (Aalbers and 
Christophers 2014; Béland 2007; Madden and Marcuse 2016).  
The shift to neoliberal forms of socio-economic regulation and cultural-political imaginaries was 
associated with the increased centrality of credit-money in the accumulation process (Jessop 2013) and to the 
importance of wealth derived from the capitalisation of claims on future surplus value, i.e. the ownership of 
fictitious – yet socially effective – capital, as in the case of stocks, bonds, and land (Harvey 2013).  
Finance and finance-led growth has become central to a burgeoning multidisciplinary research agenda, 
especially after the 2008 crisis. This rich scholarship is especially significant for urban political economy 
(see inter alia Aalbers 2020; Halbert and Attuyer 2016; Sokol 2017). Contributions have explored the 
preconditions and results of the growing weight that credit has in the supply and demand of residential and 
commercial real estate (Aalbers 2019; Weber 2015); the role of financial instruments and financial expertise 
in construing real estate as an investment diversification opportunity (Guironnet, Attuyer and Halbert 2016); 
the work of financial innovation, that enabled the transformation of credit relations involving urban assets 
into tradable securities (Gotham 2009); and the importance of state or public-private investment schemes and 
asset management funds in enabling and sustaining the flow of finance into urban development and land 








changes happening outside the built environment (Schwartz 2012; Toporowski 2010; van Loon and Aalbers 
2017). These structural factors help construct what R. Fernandez and M.B. Aalbers (2016) defined as “a wall 
of money” sustaining urban development. 
UDPs are a good empirical reference for studying the changing accumulation strategies and hegemonic 
projects in contemporary cities. Since large-scale UDPs have special relevance for urban economies, they 
can be conceived of as magnifying lenses for reading actors’ agency and place-specific political economic 
conditions, as well as reconnecting them to the extra-local trends affecting the spatial and functional 
transformation of the social, political, and physical cityscapes (Bryson et al. 2017; Guironnet and Halbert 
2014).  
There are several possible explanations of the genesis and significance of large-scale UDPs, but scholars 
generally consider them as the currently prevailing tool for remaking the urban fabric (Orueta and Fainstein 
2008). Contributors observed how the discourses and material practices associated to UDPs tend to frame 
them as “creators of growth” seemingly independent from the «residential and entrepreneurial demands of 
[the] localities» they are embedded in (Savini and Aalbers 2016, 880-1).  
UDPs have recurrent features: changes in land-use; several public and private funding streams; an 
increasing importance of the financialisation both of real estate and the land markets; the involvement of 
various institutional actors on different scales of action; and the presence of strategic players, such as 
developers, property owners, local governments, and equity funds. UDPs stress the importance of public-
private partnerships as a structure and process of urban governance and as the go-to solution for providing 
strategic metropolitan infrastructure. 
Scholars highlighted that UDPs favour the erosion of the rules and processes of decision-making of local 
representative bodies, increasingly downplayed in favour of the quick and effective delivery of the projects 
(Raco 2014). The well-known «new choreography of elite power» (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez 
2002, 542) is taking place precisely within this space of weakened collective decision-making. UDPs are 
legitimised in public and political arenas using various narratives, such as the need to modernise cities, the 
weakness of public sector, and the limits imposed by austerity, and they are sustained by the deployment of 
various techniques of local stakeholder engagement and participatory methods (Moini 2012). Moreover, the 
effect of UDPs on the city is selectively presented in terms of the positive spill-over that urban renewal 
would have on surrounding property prices (Türkün 2011). These discursive and material practices help 
legitimise UDPs as desirable and almost inescapable features of contemporary cities, a sign of their spatial, 
functional, and economic development. In brief, UDPs are constructed as the best urban actions for pursuing 




In order to enquire into the socio-spatial impacts of UDPs in Rome, we selected the case study of the new 
Italian headquarters of the BNP Paribas bank, located within a wider large-scale development site. We 
conducted an extensive review of existing secondary data, particularly planning and policy documents, 
national and local databases, press releases and published PR artifacts. The collection of secondary data 
spanned over 6 years, between 2014 and 2020. The secondary data containing technical information on the 
UDP helped increase the accuracy of the description of the case study, which will be presented in section 3. 








involved in our case study (discussed in section 4) have been examined adopting the perspective on the 
discursive “production of hegemonies” proposed by cultural political economy (Sum and Jessop 2013). 
During the period 2014-2015 two of the authors took part, as non-participant observers, to multiple rounds 
of public consultation about the redevelopment area, organised by the Local Authority District Two of Rome 
and involving citizens and all the major stakeholders of the project in a participatory process (Moini 2017). 
In elaborating our analysis, we made use of their field diaries and extensive notes on informal exchanges of 
information with stakeholders. 
Finally, we integrated the available evidence by conducting, in 2020, an hour and a half in-depth interview 
with an employee of BNP Paribas Real Estate involved in the realisation of the new headquarters, who 
prefers to remain anonymous.  
All collected data, primary and secondary, are in Italian. We decided to rely mostly on indirect renderings 
of texts and of the interviewee’s words, rather than on literal translations. In all the cases where we refer to 
discursive artifacts, a link to the original Italian text is provided in the footnotes.   
In order to organise the evidence we gathered and use them to make sense of the case study, we present an 
interpretative model which borrows from process tracing analysis (Busetti and Dente 2017; Ravazzi 2018)3. 
The model breaks up a logical process of causation in a sequence of steps (Beach 2017). In section 4 we will 
discuss each step together with the supporting evidence emerging from the case study. In implementing this 
method, we relaxed some of its most stringent requirements and focused on the advantage it offers for 
formulating and discussing an interpretative hypothesis in relation to a case study (Bennett and Elman 2006). 
Our usage of some analytical tools deriving from process tracing is intended to be purely analogical, with no 
ambition to test the hypothesis with the level of confidence attained by rigorous application of the technique 
(see inter alia Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett 2010).  
 
 
3. Case presentation and discussion 
 
3.1 Contextualising the case study 
 
The new headquarters of BNP Paribas is located in the historical Pietralata neighbourhood, in the Eastern 
IV District of the city, not far from the city centre. In broad terms, the site where the case study is located is 
what remains of an unrealised large-scale public project contained in the 1965 masterplan of Rome: the 
Sistema Direzionale Orientale (SDO), or the Eastern Directional System. The SDO as a whole was 
abandoned, while a minor part of it has been reconverted in one of the 18 urban-metropolitan sub-centres of 
the current masterplan (see figure 1). The Quintiliani sub-centre should eventually host advanced public and 
private research and commercial facilities. Until the present, the sub-centre remained largely on paper.  
The Pietralata area has been the first one where a PR.INT.4 has been launched in Rome. The programme 
is aimed at urban renewal, and particularly at addressing urban decay. After a first approval in 2013, the 
 
3 We are indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for directing us towards this method. We would like to thank 
she/he and the second referee for their constructive comments that greatly helped to improve the paper.  
4 PR.INT. means Programmi Integrati (Integrated programmes), one of the many planning tools introduced in the 1990s (Law 
179/1992), and it has a mixed legacy. On the one hand, it tried to relate spatial goals with social, economic, and environmental 
goals in a stricter and more direct manner than traditional planning tools. On the other hand, it tried to overcome the rigidity 








PR.INT. was finalised in 2019, over a decade after its drafting. In the first phase of the programme, 14 out of 
29 private projects will be realised, and their revenues will finance 9 public projects out of the planned 31.  
Another national policy programme landed here: the so-called Piano Città, a funding programme of the 
national government which was expected to multiply public investments through public-private partnerships. 
The public resource obtained for the area through the Piano Città have been directed to small projects of 
minor systemic significance (Pizzo 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1 - The area of the case study: plans, programmes and projects. The letters indicate the planned interventions financed by 
Piano Città, the blue dotted line represents the subway B line and the blue dots subway stations.  
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
The BNP Paribas headquarters is located within a main redevelopment area where an old railway station 
(Tiburtina station) was rebuilt in 2006-2011 in order to become the main station for high-speed trains. As it 
happened in Milan, Turin, Vienna and Berlin, this station should have become a main connectivity hub and 
thus the pivot for the renewal of its surrounding area.  
The Tiburtina station and the BNP Paribas headquarters are part of the major redevelopment programme 
launched in the early 2000s by the national railways management company, Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI), 












3.2 The new headquarters of BNP Paribas: the Orizzonte Europa building 
 
Between 2011 and 2012, BNP Paribas acquired an area of 7,350 m2 from RFI for 73.2 million euros. It 
was the first plot to be redeveloped out of the 92 hectares of past railway working sites and brownfield sites 
owned by RFI and the Municipality of Rome, which owned 2/3 and 1/3 of the area, respectively. 
The deal reached with BNP Paribas for the new building Orizzonte Europa was the first of its kind in 
Rome, but similar trajectories have been followed in Turin and Milan (Moini, Pizzo, and Vicari Haddock 
2019). In fact, the three main banking groups in the country – Intesa San Paolo, Unicredit, and BNP Paribas 
– moved their headquarters near formerly secondary, recently renewed high-speed train stations, which 
became strategic locations of real estate investment in the country.  
Orizzonte Europa has a total surface of 75,000 m2, despite an initial allocation of building rights for 
43,800 m2. The new building can host 3,300 employees, with twelve office floors and around 20,000 m2 of 
underground floors. Besides offices, it hosts 2,100 m2 for canteens, a separate VIP restaurant, a kindergarten, 
a gym, and a 300-seat auditorium5. It is adjacent to the new train station and surrounded by a new system of 
streets, parking lots, and a square, which should contribute to the overall regeneration of the area. 
Ferservizi and FS Sistemi Urbani, two subsidiaries of FS, finalised the deal with BNP Paribas for around 
1,000 euro/m2, and the revenues from the deal contributed to financing the new Tiburtina station6.  
The land and property owner in the area is a public national actor whose core business is cargo and 
passenger railway transport. The holding group FS has the Ministry of Finance as its single public 
shareholder and owns various subsidiaries that operate the railway network and carry out ancillary activities. 
One of these subsidiaries is especially important in our case: FS Sistemi Urbani. It is 100% controlled by FS, 
and its mission is the valorisation of real estate assets owned by the holding group, which are no longer 
employed in core business operations. FS owns a large asset wealth as a result of over a hundred years of 
infrastructural investments in transportation carried out by the national government. Stations in large and 
small cities across the country, former industrial yards for storage and maintenance, and central and local 
office buildings are examples of the assets FS and its subsidiaries can sell or redevelop. By turning its 
productive assets into prospective real estate assets, the FS group is increasingly functioning as a landed 
capitalist rather than solely as a traditional commercial one. 
BNP Paribas is a major transnational financial player that originated in Europe but operates in 72 
countries worldwide. As of 2021, it is the third largest bank holding company in the world by assets. The 
French group acquired in 2006 the Italian banking group Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), which was 
among the largest in the country and historically based in Rome. Consequently, the financial investor in our 
case is a large financial conglomerate operating at the transnational level but deeply rooted in the Italian, and 
especially Roman, context.  
Overall, BNP Paribas invested around 300 million euros for the realisation of the new headquarters. The 
deal was concluded by BNP Paribas Real Estate, the real estate subsidiary of the French group. BNP Paribas 
Real Estate acquires and valorises assets in the built environment across Europe, operating as a consultancy 
firm for real estate projects, a developer of commercial buildings, an asset management firm, and an 
 
5 https://bnl.it/it/Scopri-BNL/Chi-Siamo/BNL-Oggi/Spazi-e-modelli-lavorativi/Roma-Orizzonte-EUROPA.   
6 The Tiburtina station, as well as all the major railroad stations in the main Italian cities, is managed by another subsidiary of 
FS, Grandi Stazioni, a joint stock company whose majority shareholder is FS (60%) and the minority is Eurostazioni (40%), a 
private joint stock participated by three major Italian investment groups: the Benetton Group, the Caltagirone Group, and the 
Pirelli Group. The business model of Grandi Stazioni, geared towards the refurbishment of central stations into commercial 








investment manager. In the case we are examining, it valorises the assets BNP Paribas acquired in Rome, 
which include the buildings formerly owned by BNL, many of which are located in prestigious locations in 
the city centre.  
In our case study, BNP Paribas does not represent interest-bearing capital, i.e. the class fraction lending 
capital to be invested in productive activities and earning an interest. Instead, BNP Paribas and BNP Paribas 
Real Estate function as commercial capital (facilitating the circulation of ownership titles in the urban 
environment and earning a service fee) and landed capital (pursuing ad hoc valorisations of owned properties 
to maximise rent). 
The third and last main economic actor involved in the UDP is Parsitalia General Contractor, a 
subsidiary of the Parsitalia holding group that is controlled by a family of building developers, the Parnasi. 
Parsitalia acted as a general contractor for Orizzonte Europa that led and coordinated the various industrial 
capitals mobilised to realise the project, such as construction and engineering companies.  
The Orizzonte Europa project was planned, approved, and realised over seven years. In that same time 
span, due to the unstable political context of Rome, three different political majorities followed one another: 
the centre-right coalition of G. Alemanno (2008-13), the centre-left of I. Marino (2013-15) and the “post-
political” M5S majority of V. Raggi (2016-present). The changing political majorities did not influence the 
regulative context in which the project was embedded. The large-scale UDP centred around the Tiburtina 
railway is an example of the contractual approach to the regulation of urban development, which emerged as 
a central policy tool for urban planning since the 1990s (Governa and Salone 2005). Over the two decades of 
redevelopment, a series of bilateral agreements between the municipality and RFI7 superseded the 
specifications of the city’s masterplan, and bent land-use regulations to accommodate the needs of the 
property owner (e.g. allowing an increase of tradable building rights in exchange for the prospective 
realisation of public services or infrastructures). 
 
3.3 The outcomes of the project 
 
Orizzonte Europa is considered a major success by the main economic actors involved in the UDP. Setting 
aside the direct benefits accruing BNP Paribas – which we will discuss in further details in the next section – 
the project allowed RFI to move ahead with the redevelopment of the remaining plots in the Tiburtina area 
with the further sale of two of the eleven plots8: one acquired by the University of Rome La Sapienza9 and 
the other by MTK Developments10. However, the nature of the collective benefits deriving from the 
redevelopment is less clear.  
On the one hand, the new headquarters and the other projects in the area added one positive economic 
outcome to the neighbouring districts: the average housing prices in the Tiburtina area remain higher than 
the city average. The 2008 crisis generated a prolonged stagnation of the real estate sector in Rome (Crisci 
2019). Housing prices did not resume the upward trend of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and they dropped 




8 https://www.investinitalyrealestate.com/it/property/roma-tiburtina-area-da-valorizzare/.  
9 https://web.uniroma1.it/gareappalti/sites/default/files/Disciplinare_tecnico_progettazione.pdf.  








the city average in the study area11 where important transformations were expected because of the Tiburtina 
station project (see figure 2). During the planning and construction of the BNP Paribas headquarters from 
2011-17, housing prices of the area remained more stable than those of the city overall.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Trend in housing prices in the selected area and Rome; chronology of UDPs in the area. 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the data of the National Revenue Agency. 
 
On the other hand, diffuse and long-term spatial, economic, and social outcomes are less evident and more 
difficult to ascertain. In urban and planning perspective, there is no evidence that the project achieved the 
expected effects on the neighbouring space (e.g. enhancing the connection between the Tiburtina station and 
the Pietralata district12). It stands almost completely separate from the neighbourhood in a compact, quasi-
autonomous, and self-confined spatial configuration that does not contribute to connect the two sides of the 
Tiburtina area through a public pathway. 
Regarding the impacts on the redevelopment of the broader site, it has not contributed to accelerating the 
realisation of the Quintiliani sub-centre, where a single public complex – the new headquarters of the 
national institute of statistics ISTAT – is in its design phase13. The project had little effect on the Tiburtina 
station too. Orizzonte Europa did not contribute to the scalar change of the station into the main transport 
hub of the city. From a strategic urban project, the station has been scaled back to a commercial hub that has 
borne little success to date, with many retail spaces yet to be sold or already emptied even before the 
COVID-19 pandemics.  
There are two crucial areas where Orizzonte Europa, together with the renewed train station, should 
demonstrably produce positive effects if the premises regarding the collective desirability of the project are 
to be met. These are two dimensions of urban inequality and social fragility, which are particularly severe in 
 
11 For convenience in analysing the data, we compared the city’s average to the value of one “OMI zone”: zone D16, where 
the case study is located. OMI stands for “Units of the Real Estate Observatory” of the National Revenue Agency. 
12 https://www.atelierfemia.com/it/2017/06/nuova-sede-bnl-bnp-paribasroma/. 








the surrounding neighbourhoods. First, the housing stock in the populous Pietralata neighbourhood exhibits 
the highest level of physical obsolescence in the city14. The renewal of that housing stock is a prospective 
result of the project, as a consequence of the increased attractiveness of the location for professionals and 
skilled workers15. Second, the project should have some positive impacts on the underlying social problems 
and socio-economic fragilities in the neighbouring areas. The social fragility index16 of the three eastern 
planning zones closest to Orizzonte Europa – C5 “Tiburtino Nord”, A5 “Casal Bertone”, G5 “Pietralata” – 
are, respectively, significantly higher (4.25), higher (2.36) and slightly higher (1.15) than the base value for 
the city (0)17.  
However, disaggregated data at the planning zone level for these two central dimensions of urban social 
exclusion are derived from the 2011 Census. It is not yet possible to ascertain through quantitative data the 
impact, if any, of the project on them. Nonetheless, even discounting the impact on social inequality, the 
project exhibits limited impacts on the surrounding areas while well-defined and conspicuous benefits are 
observable for its promoters.   
In the next section we will present an interpretive model that helps to explain why the project of the new 
headquarters has resulted in concentrated benefits with minimal positive externalities on the area where it is 
located, and on the city’s development trajectory. 
 
 
4. Interpreting the case study  
 
The description of the case study allowed us to identify the main actors involved in the project and their 
main interests and goals on the basis of the class fraction they represent. Moreover, the analysis identified an 
outcome of the project that we consider worthy of further enquiry: it is viewed as a success by the key actors 
involved in its realisation, but it had weak and limited impacts on the neighbouring areas. 
As explained in section 2.2, for better understanding our case we devised an interpretative model inspired 
by process tracing analysis (see figure 3).  
The knowledge objective we are pursuing in studying the new headquarters of BNP Paribas is to improve 
our understanding of the characteristics that UDPs in Rome have acquired over the past decades. The 
assumption here is that our case study shares one or more paradigmatic features with those UDPs.  
We identified a twofold causal mechanism which helps explain the outcome of the case study, drawing 
from the concept of collusive regime and from a neo-Gramscian analysis of the political economy of Rome. 
First, our hypothesis is that UDPs developed in Rome function according to the typical configuration of 
hegemonic projects, i.e. they establish a provisional coherence between specific local and extra-local 
economic interests, and they are presented as the most suitable course of action for reaching goals that are in 
the general interest of the city. Second, UDPs are crucial components of trans-scalar accumulation strategies 
of actors that aim to maximise the land and property rent deriving from the urban assets they own. 
 
14 The rate of building obsolescence in the area is 2.29, among the highest in the city, the city average being 0.75 (Roma 
Capitale 2016).  
15 We do not express a value judgement on the desirability of such outcome, which may introduce further social issues, such 
as the risk of gentrification.    
16 The social fragility index is a weighted average of four indicators: employment rate, unemployment rate, ratio of youth-to-
adult and educational attainment (Roma Capitale 2016). 










Figure 3 - Interpretive model of the case: step-by-step description.  
Source: Author’s elaboration on Beach and Pedersen (2013). 
 
The logical causal process can be subdivided in several interconnected steps, which allow us to detail the 
unfolding of the causal relationship and present the evidence supporting our hypothesis.  
The first step refers to the recurrent public and political discourse in Rome about the necessary 
involvement of private actors in urban programmes and projects. Conventional explanations of private sector 
involvement stress the poor financial situation of the city, which binds the local government’s hands and 
obliges it to rely on private investments for pursuing urban development goals18.  
A former cabinet member for urban planning, who oversaw the realisation of Orizzonte Europa at the 
time, explained the significance of the new headquarters in similar terms. He stated that only through this 
private investment, the redevelopment of the Tiburtina area – a process fifty years in the making – was 
finally set in motion19. Similarly, the former CEO of RFI maintained that selling the site to BNP Paribas 
represents an important first step towards the valorisation of the Tiburtina area and towards its 
transformation into a strategic asset for the city20. Public and private actors converge in construing private 
interests as a fundamental driver of long-term urban development.  
 










This political and public discourse does not circulate only within the local public sphere, but it is 
replicated at the national scale. During the press conference celebrating the inauguration of the new 
headquarters, the former Italian Prime Minister P. Gentiloni stated that Orizzonte Europa is an “investment 
on the future of the city” and a potential trigger of additional public and private investments in the whole 
eastern Rome21. The public relevance of private engagement is the key underlying idea here. Consequently, 
UDPs tend to be framed as sites of mediation between public goals and private priorities. 
Moving to the second step of the proposed causal mechanism, the UDPs are initiated by key economic 
actors with the purpose of realising profitable investments in the built environment. These accumulation 
strategies are carried out by agents that are positioned at different points in the process of accumulation (i.e. 
represent different fractions of capital). The capability of advancing fractional interests while sustaining the 
expansion of a localised process of accumulation determines the success of a specific strategy in a given 
socio-economic and spatial context.  
Our case study can be analysed considering the convergent strategy pursued by the two most important 
players: RFI and BNP Paribas. RFI developed a nation-wide strategy of valorisation of the urban assets it 
owns. By redeveloping the Tiburtina station, it increased the prospective rent derived from the surrounding 
brownfield sites. In this case, RFI acts as a real estate actor and a representative of landed capital that tries to 
capture the rent gap deriving from the assets it owns. Through restructuring its core activities, RFI was able 
to turn previously productive sites into prospective real estate assets, whose high profit potential derives 
from their location inside the main metropolitan areas of the country22. It is worth noting that this very same 
process of assetisation – an important dimension of financialisation (Ward and Swyngedouw 2018) – is 
associated with a process of privatisation of former publicly owned properties.  
BNP Paribas acquired and developed the plot in Tiburtina for achieving two main goals. On the one hand, 
the bank declared that it was guided in the choice of the project by functional reasons. In choosing the site, 
the bank could take advantage of the existing and planned infrastructures: the new station has a direct line to 
the Fiumicino International Airport, a subway station, and a bus terminal for local and regional public 
transport. Moreover, there is the rationalisation of its office buildings in Rome, which also means a 
substantial reduction of management costs. The consolidation of administrative functions in the new 
headquarters vacated eight BNL buildings23, cutting the yearly expenses on maintenance and utilities24.  
On the other hand, Orizzonte Europa had a significance that goes beyond the reduction of costs for the 
bank: it contributed to opening a new accumulation strategy in the city centre. The old office buildings 
located in central Rome have been converted into real estate assets to redevelop or sell. As the employee 
BNP Paribas Real Estate explained during our interview, the initial investment of about 300 million euros in 
the new headquarters may earn the banking group a two or threefold return when the redevelopment of the 
bank’s property located in the inner city will be completed25. These prospective gains seem very realistic 
considering the example of the residential complex Domus Aventino, formerly a BNL office building, 




23 https://bnl.it/rsc/SupportingFiles/47_Nuova_sede_BNL.pdf.  
24 https://bnl.it/it/Responsabilita-Sociale/Responsabilita-Ambientale/Sedi-ecosostenibili.  








metre26. The Orizzonte Europa project, apparently spatially confined to the Tiburtina area, is part of a 
broader accumulation strategy aiming at the valorisation of bank’s properties throughout the city.  
The third main actor involved in the development of Orizzonte Europa is the Parsitalia group. If BNP 
Paribas and RFI had a leading role, the developer fulfils a subordinate and instrumental role in the 
realisation of the accumulation strategy connected to real estate valorisation. However, the Parnasi family is 
a good representative of the local type of developer-cum-builder-cum-property owner that played a major 
role in the sprawling development of the city since the 1950s (Erbani 2013). In the early 2000s, the 
Parsitalia group formed a partnership with BNL and BNP Paribas for the realisation of a conspicuous UDP 
in the high-end residential and business district of EUR, one of the most valuable real estate areas in the city. 
The UDP was the 172,000 m2 Europarco Business Park that is comprised of two skyscrapers and a mall27. 
The Parnasi family had stable and long-lasting links with local and national political actors, as a recent 
judicial investigation has brought to the public attention28. This actor was an important component of the 
network that presides over the local “space of dependence” (Cox 1998) and interacts with extra-local and 
trans-scalar actors, functioning as a connector or, vice versa, as a circuit breaker of the capital flows directed 
towards and outwards the city. 
Despite being framed as the result of a mediation between public and private interests, the UDPs in Rome 
seem to respond to a different relational logic. They are the outcome of a contingent coherence between 
accumulation strategies directed to valorise urban assets. If there is a mediation, it happens between private 
interests, particularly between the interests and goals of local actors and trans-scalar actors that operate 
within the local space of dependence. 
The contingent and strategic choices taken by private players are powerful drivers of territorial 
differentiation and spatial inequality. Land-use regulation has been a standard public response to this 
tendency towards unequal and chaotic growth. However, the regulatory regime in Rome has been framed by 
the idea of “planning by doing” for several decades (Iacovino 2016). As a result, the masterplan «does not 
plan. It ratifies. It does not invest in the future, it regulates the counts with the past. It does not shape the 
structure of the city, it does not have a vision but it takes note of what was produced by the agreements 
between public authority and landed property» (de Lucia and Erbani 2016, 36). 
The third step in the discussion of the causal mechanism concerns how the accumulation strategies acquire 
legitimacy and gather consensus. We would like to introduce this dimension by the means of an example 
from the case study. During the press conference presenting Orizzonte Europa, the former president of BNL 
stated that few investments were comparable to the new headquarters in terms of symbolic importance and 
future impact on the development of the city29. The bank discursively legitimised the project by appealing to 
the contribution it will give to the future of Rome. This idea is only one discursive trope deployed to 
represent the UDP as highly valuable and desirable for the city and its dwellers. The actors involved in or 
supportive of the project – the national and local politicians, the business community, architects and 
urbanists – represented it using the repertoire of contemporary politico-economic imaginaries: digitalisation, 
 
26 https://domusaventino.it/appartamenti_aventino/. 
27 http://www.parsitalia.it/media/pages/39/attach/Parsitalia%20Brochure.pdf.  
28 The group was the main developer in the large-scale UDP for the realisation of the new A.S. Roma football stadium. After a 
scandal emerged around an alleged corruption attempt brought about by the developer, and after the project was put on hold in 
the late 2010s, the main subsidiaries of the Parsitalia holding were liquidated and the proceedings were used to pay the debt 










innovation, regeneration, sustainability, etc. These hegemonic representations are advanced and replicated by 
promoters, realisers, and regulators, and they are reinforced and diffused through media engagement 
campaigns. 
These imaginaries offer a set of values and principles deployed to help legitimise the projects vis-à-vis 
alternative uses of resources and space. These ideas help coordinate the interests and goals of the actors that 
promote and realise the projects while minimising the opposition from those who are passively subjected to 
them (e.g. the inhabitants of neighbouring areas). They are a fundamental component of the hegemonic 
project associated with the accumulation strategies realised through the UDPs. 
A common discursive trope employed in the case of Orizzonte Europa is the regenerative potential that the 
project has. The building is depicted as a powerful stimulus to the regeneration of the Tiburtina area because 
it will repurpose the neighbourhood to host a variety of advanced service companies and new businesses. On 
top of revitalising the surrounding area, the project is described as having a systemic value because it will 
accelerate the renewal of public transport and the infrastructure stock connecting the new building and 
Tiburtina station with other hubs within and outside the city30.  
The repertoire of imaginaries deployed is naturally much broader. For example, the building has been 
designed and publicised as an innovative project in terms of sustainability, which directly aims at minimising 
the environment impact of its construction and day-by-day operations31. Among the various discursive 
tropes, it is useful to consider the very same idea that guided the architect who designed the project, A. 
Femia, in conceiving the building. Femia stated that the concept for the new headquarters has been proposed 
by the former president of BNL, who had invited the architect to answer the question: how should the 
headquarters appear if the bank wishes to be perceived as a linear and transparent business32? Linearity and 
transparency evoke clarity, coherence, public accountability, straightforwardness, and full visibility of the 
reasons that guide choices and the means used for achieving them. As the employee of BNP Paribas Real 
Estate we interviewed explained, in realising Orizzonte Europa «the bank is doing the bank's business»33: the 
bank aims to maximise the return on its investment. Nonetheless, it needs to frame its choice as transparent 
and linear. This discursive device not only legitimises the project, but it turns it into symbol of the renewed 
relationship between the city (here understood as the sum of prospective clients of the bank) and BNP 
Paribas. The idea conveyed is that the bank is changing its approach in doing business, and it is returning to 
be a trustworthy partner of consumers and smallholders after the tremendous negative impact of the 2008 
crisis on the public perception of the banking sector. 
The final step in the description of the causal mechanism is how the collusive regime of Rome facilitates 
the realisation of UDPs characterised by the lack of public goods and services provided to the community. 
The problem is describing the processes that open windows of opportunity for pursuing the interests and 
goals of the promoters of the projects, regardless of their potential benefits or prospective costs for the city.  
Two regulatory practices – both historical features of the urban regime of Rome – are at play. First, the 
municipality allows the immediate start of works at the construction site, but it postpones, at times 




31 https://bnl.it/it/Scopri-BNL/Chi-Siamo/BNL-Oggi/Spazi-e-modelli-lavorativi/Roma-Orizzonte-EUROPA.  
32 https://st.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-10-09/posa-prima-pietra-lheadquarter-134718.shtml?uuid=Ab8eWLrI. 
33 «La banca fa la banca, per questi investimenti [...] ci deve essere un business case. [...] Dipende dal margine che vuoi 








the projects to the area they are located (e.g. infrastructure, parks, public pathways) and for compensating the 
public for the use of space. Second, the quantification of the complementary constructions is systematically 
downplayed, and it is disproportionately lower than the economic value of the projects it should compensate 
for (Tocci 2020, 173).  
The result of these two regulatory practices is that the public goods and services are seldom realised as 
planned, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively.   
However, the lack of direct, observable public goods deriving from the UDPs should be balanced by the 
systemic positive impacts they have on the city as a whole. Evaluating this latter effect is surely more 
difficult since the impact can be subtle and spread over several years. If we take our case study as a 
reference, the more important impact expected at the city-level is the transformation BNP Paribas can help 
to realise in the inner city. The bank holding company is a major asset owner in the city centre, and it has 
emptied many of the buildings it owns there by transferring the staff to the new headquarters. According to 
G. Caudo, a former cabinet member for urban planning, these buildings could have become a resource for 
increasing the housing stock in the central area of the city, which suffers from decades-long population 
deficit, with only 115,000 people living in central Rome out of a total population of 2.8 million. The then 
centre-left majority was asking BNP Paribas to contribute to this objective by including quotas of social 
housing in its renewed buildings34. This prospective future benefit seems quite unrealistic if one considers 
the type of redevelopment projects BNP Paribas is envisioning, such as the aforementioned Domus Aventino 
luxury complex.  
The different temporalities in which private gains and collective benefits are realised is an often-
disregarded problem of urban development. The possibility of obtaining short-term valorisation of owned 
assets is a fundamental component of accumulation strategies aiming at maximising rent. However, these 
strategies are discursively framed as sources of long-term benefits for the general public, which are often 
only loosely defined or purely imaginary. These discursive and symbolic elements confer the character of a 
collective endeavour to strategies rewarding a contingent ensemble of specific interests. They are combined 
with the selective reward of a material interest: the increased price of properties located nearby the project 
site. This shared short-term benefit is a crucial component in the creation of hegemonic projects over the 
urban environment, since it ensures a degree of “concrete coordination” between the interests and goals of 
the hegemonic fractions of capital and those of part of the subalterns. 
If the long-term benefits of a project for a whole city are difficult to ascertain, its long-term costs are even 
more elusive. They represent the long-term losses of social cohesion and social inclusion due to increasing 
inequalities, the displacement of culturally diverse neighbourhoods due to gentrification, the diminishing 
standards of living and lack of decent working opportunities for entire social strata due to a development 
model centred upon asset-valorisation and rent-extraction, and so on.   
If no conclusive evidence of the long-term costs associated with the Orizzonte Europa project can be 
given here, there is a final piece of evidence that we would like to discuss. In 2019 BNP Paribas acquired a 
brownfield site in the vicinity of the new headquarters, displacing a political squat, Officine Zero, where 
activists were providing working spaces and student accommodations. On the site of the former squat, a new 
luxury student residence is planned. The displacement of a self-managed social space that helped reveal and 
meet social needs, and potentially politicised them for social change, is a controversial result of BNP 












5. Conclusive remarks  
 
Despite the framing of UDPs as creators of shared growth and wealth, the results of our case study suggest 
that there is no such a thing as a mechanical connection between large-scale projects and a generalised 
improvement of urban living standards and socio-economic conditions.  
The engagement of extra-local and transnational actors is often described in the Italian academic literature 
and public discourse as a much-needed discontinuity from the diminished entrepreneurialism of local and 
national capitalists. Our case study does not support this conclusion. On the contrary, those actors reinforced 
and deepened the rent-seeking strategies adopted by the local business class over the decades to similar 
outcomes: the unequal distribution of benefits derived from urban development. 
The analysis of the case allows us to propose an interpretation of the nature of UDPs in Rome for further 
empirical confirmation. First, the project is a suitable occasion for realising accumulation strategies based on 
the capture of rent gaps and the valorisation of urban assets. These strategies imply a circumscribed 
coordination between the interests and goals of the various capital fractions. They incentivise the 
opportunistic commitment of resources under certain conditions: rewards are immediate, costs can be 
deferred in time or displaced to other people or places, and new opportunities for accumulation are opened 
by acting. Second, the actors involved mobilised ideational and material resources for gathering consensus 
for the project, that rewarded their specific interests, by framing their investment as the best solution for 
localised collective needs. Therefore, the case study exhibits the basic features of hegemony applied to the 
urban context.  
Finally, and consequently, the project facilitated the concentration of benefits and the generalisation of 
costs (Wilson 1980) of urban development. This imbalance between costs and benefits reflects the tendency 
of UDPs to guarantee the short-term remuneration of the private actors involved in them, while they give no 
certainty about the nature and timing of the collective benefits they may generate. 
Our case study is embedded in the collusive regime of contemporary Rome. This regime offers a general 
framework within which multiple projects can coexist. The regime legitimises these projects vis-à-vis 
alternative uses of resources and urban space, and it tones down the requirement of direct or indirect public 
benefits obtainable from them. The coexistence of multiple contingent strategies over specific sites of the 
city is one crucial factor explaining the fragmented development and the mosaic-like form of Rome. Future 
research should address the link between private investments in urban assets and Rome’s increasingly 
unequal development trajectory, displacing in space (towards the city’s outskirts) and in time (to the future 
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